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Degree correlationThe robustness of power grids is a central topic in the design of the so called ’’smart grid’’. As the total
amount of load in the power grid is becoming more and more each day, and the sizes of power grids
are becoming larger and larger each year, it will result in larger damages to the society if the power grids
broke down. For example, the Northeast blackout of 2003 in the US resulted in a loss of 61,800 MW of
electric load that served more than 50 million people ELCON (2003). In this paper we try to analyze
the measures of importance of the nodes in a power grid under cascading failure. Moreover, we introduce
the notion of degree correlation for the case where only the statistical information of a power grid is
known. Mean ﬁeld theory is used for our analysis. With these efforts, we can distinguish the most vulner-
able nodes and protect them, improving the safety of the power grid. Also we can measure if a structure is
proper for power grids. Above all, a newmulti-loop structure for smart grid is shown to be better than the
contemporary one.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction is not robust under random attack on its nodes. This threshold onlyIn recent years the robustness of power grids has attracted
much attention, since the blackout in North America, 2003, which
is reported to cause a large amount of damages ELCON (2003). It is
reported that the causes are: Group one, that FirstEnergy (FE) and
its reliability council failed to assess and understand the inadequa-
cies of FEs system, particularly with respect to voltage instability
and the vulnerability of the Cleveland–Akron area, and FE did not
operate its system with appropriate voltage criteria. Group two,
inadequate situational awareness at FirstEnergy, that FirstEnergy
did not recognize or understand the deteriorating condition of its
system. Group three, that FirstEnergy failed to manage adequately
tree growth in its transmission rights-of-way. Finally, group four,
the failure of the interconnected grid’s reliability organizations to
provide effective real-time diagnostic support U.S.-Canada Power
System Outage Task Force, xxxx. We can see that a local failure ﬁ-
nally became a large scale damage.
Natural as it is to view the power grids as complex networks,
many researchers have analyzed the structure of power grids in
this way. Cohen et al. (2000) uses the method in mean ﬁeld theory
to calculate the threshold of the Internet under which the networktakes means of degree and its square into consideration. Sol et al.
(2008) has applied the analysis of Cohen et al. (2000) to European
power grids, which are assumed to have exponentional degree dis-
tributions. This research has designed two methods of attack to the
nodes of power grid: random attack and selective attack by the de-
gree. It is found that, although only dealing with the network struc-
ture, the measures based on the theory of complex network has a
close correlation with the physical reliability measures. Later,
Wang et al. (2010) found that in fact the degree distribution of real
power grids is a sum of a truncated Geometric random variable and
an irregular discrete random variable. With these ﬁndings they ob-
tained better estimates of the threshold under selective node
breakdowns which would predict the numerical thresholds more
correctly.
In the above way, one network is considered as a whole. For one
network, there is a single threshold to represent its robustness.
There is another way to view it: considering the inﬂuence of each
node to the robustness of the network. To analyze this way, a dis-
tribution of load and redistribution rules are needed. The simplest
method is to assign the load on a node just by its own degree. A
popular but much more complicated method is to estimate the
betweenness of a node as its load. And the redistribution load
are forwarded following the shortest path. However, the principle
based on betweenness is reasonable only for small or medium-
sized networks due to the requirement of structural information
of the whole networks; while the principle based on node degree
outweighs by its simplicity, but is inferior owing to its only
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thereby restricting many actual applications. Therefore, how to
balance the complexity and the information quantity is a signiﬁ-
cant topic. Wang and Rong (2009), for example, deﬁnes the load
of a node j as Lj ¼ kj
P
m2Cj km
 h ia
, and the load redistributed to a
neighbor i after j is attacked is proportional to i’s initial load, where
Cj represents the set of all neighboring nodes of the node j and a is
a tunable parameter. In the case where a < 0:7, its investigation by
the numerical simulations leads to a counterintuitive ﬁnding on
the US power grid that the attack on the nodes with the lowest
loads is more harmful than the attack on the ones with the highest
loads, while the condition is the opposite when a = 1. This model is
adopted by Wang et al. (2011), where a is ﬁxed to 1. In this case,
three indexes are designed to represent the importance of each
node under attack. Several strategies of attack are designed and
simulated. It is found that the RIF based strategy, which picks the
node with the highest RIF value as the victim node, has extremely
good performance. What’s more, to achieve the same attack
strength, it requires signiﬁcantly less computation complexity.
With the same computation complexity, it yields stronger attacks.
This shows that RIF is an appropriate index to represent the neces-
sity of a node to be protected. In Zhang et al. (2012), a similar mod-
el is adopted, where the initial load of a node i is deﬁned as
Li ¼ aki þ ð1 aÞ
P
j2Ci kj.
This paper is devoted to discover the essential relation of the in-
dexes raised by Wang et al. (2011) and the degree distribution of
the power grid to avoid complicated simulations. Section 2 will
introduce the network model and the redistribution rules as the
base of the analysis. Section 3 explores not only the essential rela-
tion between two indexes of Wang et al. (2011) but also the rela-
tion between the indexes and the degree correlation of power
grid. A novel structure of power grid is analyzed in Section 4 adopt-
ing these indexes and compared to the structure of U.S. power grid.
Conclusion is made in Section 5.
2. System model
In this section, we introduce the network model of the power
grid as in Wang and Rong (2009). Besides, the notion of degree cor-
relation in a network is also demonstrated here.
2.1. Power grid model
As usual, the power grid can be viewed as a graph, with substa-
tions as its nodes and transmission lines as its edges. Moreover,
each node is allocated with an initial load, deﬁned as
Li ¼ ki
P
m2Ci km
 
, where ki is the degree of node i and Ci denotes
the neighborhood of node i.
When a substation is destroyed, it cannot share any load from
its neighbors. And the load on this substation is redistributed to
its neighbor nodes, proportional to the initial load of each neighbor
node, which is
Dij ¼ Li LjP
m2Ci Lm
: ð1Þ
Each node i has a capacity Ci which is the maximum load it can
carry. Ci is proportional to the load Li, i.e.
Ci ¼ T  Li: ð2Þ
If the load of a node after redistribution exceeds its capacity, it
will fail and redistribute its load to its neighbors in the same way.
We can anticipate that this may cause further breaking down of
other nodes. In complex networks literature, this phenomenon is
called Cascading Failure.This mode of load allocation was ﬁrst introduced by Wang and
Rong (2009), but with few analysis. In the view of cascading failure,
it provides a kind of description for the large scale blackouts in
power grids. The authors of Wang et al. (2011) developed three in-
dexes to describe whether a node is critical in terms of causing cas-
cading failures.
2.2. Degree-correlated network
Power grids are not pure random networks. In fact, a power
grid appears to be a small world. Zhifang Wang et al. try to build
new structure of networks similar as real power grids in Wang
et al. (2010). An important property is the degree correlation. Fol-
lowing the way of Statistical physicists, it is convenient to use ejk
to denote the probability that a randomly chosen edge connects
two nodes, one with degree jþ 1, the other with degree kþ 1.
We also denote qk as the probability that in randomly choosing
an edge, and then randomly choosing one end of that edge, we ar-
rive at a node with degree kþ 1. Apparently, we have qk ¼
P1
j¼0ejk
for undirected graphs. Based on these, the Pearson correlation
coefﬁcient r for degree pairs gives us a measure of assortativity,
which is given by
r ¼ 1
r2q
X1
j¼0
X1
k¼0
jkðejk  qjqkÞ:
Newman (2003) observed that essentially all social networks
measured appear to have a positive measure of assortativity, while
other types of networks (information networks, technological net-
works, biological networks) appear to be have a negative measure
of assortativity, which are called disassortative.
In a national power grid we usually have thousands of buses
and transmission lines. When designing the structure of a power
grid like this, it is difﬁcult to obtain the exact information before-
hand. Sometimes we may only know the statistical information of
the whole network and can still analyze the importance of each
node in this structure, which is shown in the following section.
3. Analysis of RIF
In Wang et al. (2011), the authors propose three metrics for
describing power grid vulnerability. The ﬁrst one is POF (the Per-
centage-of-failure), which is
k ¼ 1 N
0
N
:
Here N is the number of nodes before the attack and N0 is the num-
ber of survived nodes after the attack. POF is a direct measure of
severity of attacks, but needing much simulation. We can adopt it
as a measure of importance for each node. Apparently it is related
with the system tolerance T and node i, so we will use kðT; iÞ to de-
note it. This means that when T is ﬁxed, the loss of node i will cause
a failure of NkðT; iÞ nodes as a whole. When a large part of the whole
power grid cannot work properly, a large scale blackout occurs. This
is an important safety criterion for safety issue.
The second one is RED (Required redundancy). The RED value of
a node i is deﬁned as the minimal required system tolerance value
that cascading failure dose not occur when node i is taken down,
which can be written as REDi ¼ inf {Tjno cascading failure exists
when node i is taken down}. This value is also obtained through
simulations in Wang et al. (2011).
The third metric is RIF (Risk if failure). The RIF value of node i is
RIFi ¼ LiP
m2Ci Lm
: ð3Þ
Fig. 2. The distributins of RED and RIF in the Western North American power grid
network calculated in Wang et al., 2011.
Fig. 3. The structure designed in Wang et al., 2010.
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Western North American power grid, it is seen that these two are
very similar. As a result, the authors of Wang et al. (2011) indicate
that there may be a strong correlation between RED and RIF (see
Fig. 1). In fact, they actually are closely related, which will be
shown next. These two measures are introduced because POF can-
not vary the importance of each node very well. They are effective
in varying the importance of nodes under node attack.
3.1. Relation between RIF and RED
In the power grid model, when node i is damaged, a cascading
failure occurs if and only if the total amount of the redistributed
load and the primitive load exceeds one of its neighbors’ capacity.
As a node j in the neighborhood of node i will have to afford a load
of Lj þ Li  LjP
m2Ci
Lm
after node i’s damage, it will be damaged if and
only if.
T <
Lj þ Li  LjP
m2Ci
Lm
Lj
¼ 1þ LiP
m2Ci Lm
¼ 1þ RIFi: ð4Þ
This condition is only related with the property of node i but not
j. By the deﬁnition of RED, we have
REDi ¼ 1þ RIFi: ð5Þ
From this we know it is not strange at all that these two metrics
have very similar distributions, as shown in Fig. 2. The minor dif-
ferences between the two diagrams may result from the errors of
computer simulation. In the calculation of RED, one has to change
T little by little and operate a complicated simulation on the huge
power grid and choose one proper value of T for RED. It is not ex-
plicit when changing the value of T, as one always has to increase
or decrease by a constant step. Continuity is impossible for modern
computers.
As Li ¼ ki
P
m2Ci km
 
, we have
RIFi ¼
ki
P
m2Ci km
 
P
m2Ci km
P
j2Cmkj
  6
ki
P
m2Ci km
 
P
m2Ci kmki
¼ 1: ð6Þ
This explains why in Fig. 2, the RIFs are all below 1.0 and the
REDs are all below 2.0. The inequality is valid because we have
i 2 Cm for eachm 2 Ci. Equality is satisﬁed when the degree of each
neighbor of node i is one. In this condition, the structure of theFig. 1. The effectiveness of RED and RIF in representing the importance of nodes in
power grid Wang et al., 2011. The x axis means the number of nodes which are
attacked. while the y axis means the value of POF. Different curves represent
different attacking strategies.
Fig. 4. The basis structure of the multiple-level loop grid.whole network is a star with only one central node. If the local
structure of a power grid is nearly a star, the RIF of the central node
is nearly 1. This means that we should avoid stars in designing
power grids. Meanwhile, star graph is highly disassortative, imply-
ing the same conclusion as in our context.
3.2. relation between degree correlation and POF
We will ﬁrst adopt generation functions to study the distribu-
tion of the initial loads. Let pk denote the probability of nodes with
degree k, then the generation function of the degree distribution is
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X1
kP0
pkx
k:
Given a node with degree kþ 1, the generation function of the
degrees of its neighbors is
hkþ1ðxÞ ¼
X
jP0
jejkx
jþ1:
Then the generation function of the initial load is
gðLÞ ¼
X
kP0
pkh
k
kðxkÞ: ð7Þ
Given that cascading failure happens after node i is damaged,
we have
1þ LiP
m2Ci Lm
> T:
Assume
1þ LiP
m2Ci Lm
¼ T þ i;
where i > 0. Suppose node j is in the neighborhood of node i, then
it will cause cascading failure if and only if
ðT þ iÞ  LjP
m02Cj ;m–iLm0
þ 1 > T;
that is
T <
1þ iLjP
m02Cj ;m–i
Lm0
1 LjP
m02Cj ;m–i
Lm0
: ð8Þ
The righthand of the above inequality is less than 1þjRIFj1RIFj . It
means that if there is a damaged neighborhood, a node is more
likely to be damaged, which is trivial. This inequality can be used
for further cascading, as shown in our Algorithm 1.
As degree-correlated network is a fruitful view of the complex
network, more results may be obtained in the future, especially
for the power grid. In the power grids, a bus with high load has a
tendency to be connected to another bus with high load, just as a
bus with low load connected to another node with low load. It is
shown in Wang et al. (2010) that the line impedances of power
grids mainly obey the double Pareto lognormal (DPLN) distribu-
tion. They claim that this is because the line impedances implicitly
relate to human settlement size in the network. As a large settle-
ment size always means a large amount of energy consuming,
two nodes with high load in a power grid have a tendency to be
connected for safety. Then our dedication is natural. This result
can be compared with the Pearson correlation coefﬁcients’ values
of large power grids, such as NYSIO (New York state bulk electricity
grid) and WSCC (western United States electrical power grid)
shown in Wang et al. (2010). Although for the smaller IEEE models,
it depends.4. Simulation and calculation
4.1. simulation algorithm for POF
POF is a direct measure of severity of attacks, but needs simula-
tion. So it is not practical in a dynamic network. In order to com-
pare the effectiveness of RED and RIF to POF, it is necessary to
compute the values of POFs for each node.
Let Ei denote the diagonal matrix with the ith diagonal entry to
be 1, the others to be 0,Ei ¼
0 0
0
. .
.
1
. .
.
0 0
2
66666666664
3
77777777775
:
Let D be the redistribution matrix
D ¼
L1 a11P
m2C1
Lm
L2 a12P
m2C1
Lm
   Ln a1nP
m2C1
Lm
L1 a21P
m2C2
Lm
L2 a22P
m2C2
Lm
   Ln a2nP
m2C2
Lm
..
. ..
.
L1 an1P
m2Cn
Lm
L2 an2P
m2Cn
Ln
   Ln annP
m2Cn
Lm
2
666666664
3
777777775
;
then the algorithm to compute the values of POF is as the following
Algorithm 1. The time complexity of this algorithm is Oðn3DÞ, where
D is the maximum degree of the power grid, n the size of the power
grid.
Algorithm 1. POF calculation4.2. Analysis of a new structure
Xiao et al. (2011), designed a Multiple-level loop grid for the fu-
ture power grid. In each level the grid consists several sub-level
loops, where the basis structure is a center node attached with four
5-loops (see Fig. 4).
This kind of designing principle is not new. In Wang et al.
(2010), a similar method is used to build a correct structure for
the power grids. In their structure, several subnets are designed
in the same method. Then they are connected by the so-called Lat-
tice connection, resulting in a topology as a whole (see Fig. 3).
This Multiple-level loop structure can be modeled into a simple
graph, as shown in Fig. 5 (see Fig. 6).
All of these 21 nodes can be categorized into four groups:
A. the center node,
B. the nodes linked with the center node,
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Fig. 6. Required redundancy of the new structure.
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D. the other nodes.
As the initial load of the nodes in a speciﬁc group are the same,
we will denote the loads as LA; LB; LC ; LD, where
LA ¼ 48; LB ¼ 30; LC ¼ 24; LD ¼ 10: ð9Þ
So it can be calculated by (3) that
RIFA ¼ 25 ; RIFB ¼
5
16
; RIFC ¼ 38 ; RIFD ¼
5
17
: ð10Þ
By the deﬁnition of T, we see that k ¼ 0 when TP 1.4, as all the
RIFs range from 0.29 to 0.4. Compared to Fig. 1, it is easy to see that
the needed tolerance is less than that of the Western North Amer-
ican power grid, which is near 0.7. This means that we will need to
replace less instruments in this structure than the contemporary
structure in case we want to make sure that no single node’s dam-
age will cause a cascading failure. The time complexity is OðnD2Þ.
In the Multiple-level loop grid, there are many basic structures
like this, combined together by the transmission line. If we con-
sider it as a complex network, the following results are valid.
e11 ¼ 1; e12 ¼ 25 ; e22 ¼
3
5
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Fig. 7. Initial loads calculated in two different methods.p2 ¼
8
21
; p3 ¼
12
21
; p3 ¼
1
21
: ð12Þ
So we can get the generation function of the initial loads:
gðLÞ ¼ 8
21
x8 þ 12
2625
ð8x18 þ 36x21 þ 54x24 þ 27x27Þ þ 1
21
x48 ð13Þ
It is shown in Fig. 7 that this result is similar to the initial dis-
tribution of the loads on the nodes calculated directly.
We can see in this ﬁgure that the two distributions do not differ
very much. In fact, they reach the same value art the biggest load
(48). When we are planning to design the structure of a power grid,
we do not know the exact structure in advance. But we may obtain
some principles in some method, such as the degree distribution
and the degree correlation. We can approximate the initial load
by the statistical information of the power grid in this case. Then
we can decide if our structure is proper according to this
approximation.Fig. 5. The basis structure modeled as a graph.5. Conclusion
In this paper we go along the way developed by Wang et al.
(2011). The metrics proposed in it has been analyzed more care-
fully, adopting the method in the ﬁeld of complex network. It is
shown that these metrics indeed have inmost relation. So the sim-
ilarity among them by simulation are not by chance. We are more
conﬁdent of the effectiveness of RIF. Moreover, if we cannot obtain
the exact information of the power grid, it is possible to approxi-
mate the initial loads and the metrics.
Simulation is time-consuming for large scale power grids.
Poroseva, 2010, for example, introduces a way to reduce the com-
putation complexity of the impact of all possible combinations of
unrecoverable faults (fault scenarios) on the availability and con-
nectivity of system elements. However, it is a remaining problem
whether we could avoid complex simulations when designing
and analyzing the structures of power grid. The dream to analyze
and availability and connectivity of system elements demonstrate
the properties of a power grid totally in mathematical form is still
not fulﬁlled. The theory of complex network may help us in more
aspects. For example, as in Wang and Rong (2011), attack on edges
is also a central issue in the robustness of a power grid. If we can
apply more methods in the ﬁeld of complex network to it, we
126 W. Zhang et al. / Safety Science 64 (2014) 121–126may expect to obtain an easier way to analyze the structure of a
power grid.
In Yan et al. (2013), several nodes are attacked at the same time.
It is more complex to analyze the importance of a group of nodes in
power grid, as a problem of combinatorial optimization. Heuristic
algorithms are widely adopted nowadays because they are easier
to implement. It remains a task for us to develop an exact method
of measure for this problem and we expect to ﬁnd inspirations in
the theory of complex network.
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